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How	Parliament’s	campaign	of	attrition	forced	the
government	to	open	up	about	Brexit
The	real	battle	over	Brexit	has	not	been	about	whether	Parliament	will	get	a	final	vote,
writes	Ben	Worthy	(Birkbeck	University	of	London).	The	true	fight	is	about	information	–
about	what	kind	of	Brexit	the	government	wants,	and	what	its	impact	is	likely	to	be.	In	this,
Parliament	has	been	rather	successful.	Pressure	from	select	committees	and
Labour’s	deployment	of	an	arcane	parliamentary	procedure	have	forced	ministers	and	the	PM
to	open	up	–	and	to	reveal	the	void	where	Brexit	preparations	should	be.
The	issue	of	whether	the	government	would	allow	Parliament	a	vote	(it	seems	as	though	it	will)	and	whether	any
such	vote	will	be	meaningful	(it	won’t	be)	has	dominated	Brexit	coverage	since	the	referendum.	This	has	been	a
distraction	from	the	main	event	–	not	least	because	the	EU	Withdrawal	Act	makes	any	vote	meaningless.	When
the	Conservatives	and	Labour	whipped	their	MPs	in	the	same	direction,	they	whipped	away	Parliament’s	power
and	gave	it	to	the	EU	and	UK	government.
The	place	where	Parliament	has	actually	had	most	success	is	not		taking	back	control	of	what’s	happening,	but
actually	finding	out	what’s	going	on	(or	not	going	on).	This	was	symbolised	by	the	apparent	success	last	month
in	forcing	the	government	to	release	the	58	studies	about	the	likely	economic	impact	of	Brexit.
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MPs	and	the	public	first	got	wind	of	these	‘studies’	back	in	the	summer	when	David	Davis	mentioned	them	on	the
Andrew	Marr	show:	(see	p.11	of	this	transcript):
“That		data’s		being		gathered,		we’ve		got		50,		nearly		60		sector		analyses	already	done,	we’ve	got
planning	work	going	on	in	the	customs,		we’ve		got		planning		work		going		on		22		other		issues	
which		are		critical,		127		all		told.		All		of		them		have		got		to		be		grounded		before		we	come	to	a
conclusion	what	it	looks	like.”
Repeated	FOI	requests	for	the	studies	by	the	MEP	Molly	Scott	Cato	and	others	failed,	as	the	government
appeared	to	argue	it	would	undermine	their	ability	to	negotiate	(and	there	are	certain	protections	under	FOI	that
might	support	this	rather	bland	statement).
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In	November,	Labour	then	used	an	obscure	piece	of	parliamentary	procedure	to	force	the	government	into
releasing	its	Brexit	impact	studies,	as	this	blog	by	Andrew	Defty	explains.	Using	a	motion	for	a	return,	Labour
‘transformed	a	non-binding	opposition	day	motion	into	a	binding	resolution	of	the	House’	(see	more	on	these	here
in	this	1999	report	Section	3	(ii)).
However,	the	government	then	responded	with	an	admission	(or	confession)	that	the	’50’	or	‘60’	–	or	possibly	127
–	pieces	of	analysis	are	not	what	they	seem:	“As	we	have	made	clear,	it	is	not	the	case	that	58	sectoral	impact
assessments	exist”.	The	statement	went	on	to	explain	that	the	papers	are	a
“…	wide	mix	of	qualitative	and	quantitative	analysis,	contained	in	a	range	of	documents	developed	at
different	times	since	the	referendum.	It	examines	the	nature	of	activity	in	the	sectors,	how	trade	is
conducted	with	the	EU	currently	in	these	sectors	and,	in	many	cases,	considers	the	alternatives	after
we	leave	as	well	as	looking	at	existing	precedents.	This	analysis	ranges	from	the	very	high	level
overarching	analysis	to	sometimes	much	more	granular	level	analysis	of	certain	product	lines	in
specific	sectors.”
At	some	point,	a	discerning	reader	could	conclude,	Davis	was	being	‘economical	with	the	truth’.	Either	the	impact
studies	exist	(or	existed)	in	some	form,	or	they	didn’t.	It	now	seems	that	‘Brexit	studies’	doesn’t	mean,	as	it	were,
‘Brexit	studies’.	And	whatever	they	are,	they	won’t	be	fully	released	(though	the	ultimate	power	may	lie	with	the
DExEU	committee	here).
Back	in	July	of	2016,	when	Brexit	meant	Brexit	and	Theresa	May	had	a	majority,	her	new	government	asserted
that	it	was	for	government	to	declare	and	trigger	article	50	and	then	conduct	the	subsequent	negotiations	in	a
confidential	way.	The	government	were	keen	to	keep	things	closed	and	secret.	There	was	to	be,	famously,	no
running	commentary.
In	September	2016	Davis,	the	new	secretary	of	state	for	Brexit,	made	it	clear	the	limitations	of	any	openness,
saying	he	would	be	“as	open	as	I	can.	More	accurately,	the	Government	will	be	as	open	as	they	can”.	He	argued
that	it	may	be	‘the	most	complicated	negotiation	ever’	but	there	would	be	‘debates,	reports	by	Select	Committees
and	hearings’	and	he	promised:
“We	will	certainly	match	and,	hopefully,	improve	on	what	the	European	Parliament	sees.	At	given
times,	that	will	be	tactical,	I	am	afraid.	I	do	not	want	to	be	boring	about	it,	but	this	is	likely	to	be	the
most	complicated	negotiation	of	modern	times.	It	may	be	the	most	complicated	negotiation	of	all
times.	By	comparison,	Schleswig-Holstein	is	an	O-level	question.	We	will	not	always	be	entirely	free
agents,	but	we	will	be	as	open	as	we	can	be.”
He	also	spoke	of	the	impossibility	of	secrecy:
“…	I	will	seek	to	be	as	open	as	is	possible…Even	were	I	to	decide	that	I	was	going	to	behave	like
Rasputin	and	keep	it	all	entirely	secret,	I	would	fail.	It	would	not	be	possible…	other	Governments
would	do	it.	In	the	Government’s	own	interest,	it	is	a	better	idea	to	be	more	open	than	is	perhaps
traditional,	but	always	subject	to	the	overriding	point	that	we	cannot	pre-empt	the	negotiation.”
	In	October	the	report	from	the	House	of	Lords	EU	Select	Committee	took	a	rather	stronger	view	of	what	right
Parliament	had	(2016).
“One	of	the	key	objectives	of	parliamentary	scrutiny	is	to	ensure	transparency	–	to	cast	a	light	on	the
actions	of	the	executive.	It	is,	we	suggest,	essential	that	many	elements	of	the	forthcoming
negotiations	–	for	instance,	negotiations	affecting	acquired	rights,	or	future	cooperation	between	UK
and	EU	police	forces—should	be	conducted	transparently.”	(House	of	Lords	EU	2016a).
Since	then,	Parliament	has	been	the	key	to	shining	more	light	on	Brexit.	The	sheer	volume	of	investigation	and
scrutiny	can	be	seen	below:
Scrutiny	of	Brexit	by	Parliament,	13	July	2016	–	19	June	2017
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Written	questions 490
Written	answers 819
Select	committee	inquiries	begun 55
(House	of	Commons/UK	Parliament:	IFG
Select	committees	launched	more	than	55	inquiries	into	various	aspects	of	Brexit,	though	some	were	curtailed	by
the	June	2017	General	Election.	In	December	2016,	the	Liaison	Committee	was	the	first	body	to	subject	the
Prime	Minister	to	detailed	scrutiny	of	the	government	position	on	Brexit	revealing,	perhaps	inadvertently,	that	her
approach	was	one	of	secrecy	and	that	she	appeared	unaware	of	how	exactly	article	50	functioned.	In	one	day	in
November	2017,	in	a	‘bumper	day	for	select	committees’,	six	select	committees	questioned	different	officials	and
Ministers	on	various	aspects	of	Brexit.	In	March	2017,	the	new	DExEU	Select	Committee	scrutinised	the
government’s	objectives	and	positions	and	questioned	Davis,	who	confessed	there	had	been	no	preparation	for
what	would	happen	in	the	event	of	Brexit	talks	breaking	down	and	that	any	financial	settlement	will	favour	the	EU.
The	debate	around	the	European	Union	(Notification	of	Withdrawal)	bill	from	January	to	March	2017,	triggered	by
the	Supreme	Court	ruling,	also	gave	a	focus	to	discussion	and	debate	and	revealed	more	about	the	prospects
and	government	plans.
All	this	pressure	has	given	us	far	more	information	that	the	government	seemed	prepared	to	give	before.	We
have	had	two	major	Prime	Ministerial	speeches	and	one,	heavy,	evidence	session	(with	another	due	December
20	this	year).	Ministers	have	appeared	and	explained	(and	sometimes	contradicted	each	other)	regularly.	We’ve
also	had	a	Brexit	White	Paper	(that,	you’ll	be	pleased	to	know,	gave	us	all	14	weeks	holiday	a	year).
Brexit	has	not,	of	course,	been	fully	opened	up	by	Parliament.	The	government	refused	some	of	the	more
transparent	options,	such	as	a	cross-party	approach	via	Royal	Commission,	in	2016	and	again	in	2017.	The
January	White	Paper	was	described	as	‘largely	devoid	of	content	because	the	UK	government’s	concern	about
negotiating	secrecy’	and	offered	‘as	few	concrete	positions	as	it	is	possible	to	imagine’.	The	government	also
resisted	Parliamentary	motions	to	mandate	regular	updates	on	Brexit	to	Parliament	in	the	future.
Nevertheless,	Parliament	was	key	in	forcing	appearances.	Far	more	is	known	than	before,	and	benchmarks	have
been	lain	down	with	the	legislature’s	action	leading	to	far	greater	understanding	of	the	government’s	views	and
preparation.	And	here	is	what	has	proved	so	damaging:	the	lack	of	preparation.	Westminster’s	digging	and
pressure	have	revealed	not	what	has	been	done	but	what	has	not	been	done.	There	is	no	hidden	grand	plan,	but
a	void	at	the	heart	of	government	thinking	on	the	most	important	event	in	the	last	60	years.	And	this	is	what	the
‘58’	studies	symbolise.	As	General	Montgomery	once	said:	“I	have	not	been	told	of	any	master	plan	and	I	must
therefore	assume	there	was	none.”
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Ben	Worthy	is	a	Lecturer	in	Politics	at	Birkbeck	College.	See	also	his	paper,	Brexit	and	Open	Government	in	the
UK:	11	Months	of	May.	
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